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This study of 241 parent–child dyads from the United Kingdom (N = 120, Mage = 3.92, SD = 0.53) and Hong
Kong (N = 121, Mage = 3.99, SD = 0.50) breaks new ground by adopting a cross-cultural approach to investigate
children’s theory of mind and parental mind-mindedness. Relative to the Hong Kong sample, U.K. children
showed superior theory-of-mind performance and U.K. parents showed greater levels of mind-mindedness.
Within both cultures parental mind-mindedness was correlated with theory of mind. Mind-mindedness also
accounted for cultural differences in preschoolers’ theory of mind. We argue that children’s family environments
might shed light on how culture shapes children’s theory of mind.
Early accounts of how children acquire an under-
standing of others’ minds (or a “theory of mind”)
adopted a nativist and modular perspective that
highlighted the universality of developmental path-
ways and assumed minimal environmental inﬂu-
ence (e.g., Carruthers, 2013; Scholl & Leslie, 2001).
Challenging this view, several strands of recent
research have highlighted the importance of early
social experiences in the development of children’s
theory of mind (Hughes & Devine, 2015). For exam-
ple, Heyes and Frith (2014) have argued that learn-
ing to read minds is “a slow effortful process in
which a novice develops an important, culture-spe-
ciﬁc skill through expert tuition” (p. 1357). Support-
ing this argument, the rate at which milestones in
theory of mind are acquired (indexed by children’s
performance on the false belief task) can vary sig-
niﬁcantly across cultures. Although some studies
emphasize similarities across cultures (e.g., Cal-
laghan et al., 2005; Vinden, 1999), a growing num-
ber highlight marked contrasts (e.g., Lecce &
Hughes, 2010; Hughes et al., 2014; Liu, Wellman,
Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008).
The precise processes underpinning cross-cultural
differences in children’s understanding of mind have
yet to be identiﬁed. One interpretation is that there
are genuine cross-cultural differences in children’s
theory of mind that are attributable to contrasts in
children’s social–cultural environments (e.g., paren-
tal behaviors). An alternative interpretation of these
ﬁndings is that apparent cultural differences in task
performance might reﬂect methodological con-
founds. Our study aimed to shed new light on cul-
tural differences in preschool children’s false belief
understanding by assessing the impact of a key
aspect of children’s social environments and by
addressing methodological concerns in this ﬁeld.
From a sociocultural perspective, differences
across cultures might reﬂect contrasts in the relative
salience of mental states within speciﬁc cultures
(e.g., Lillard, 1998; Taumoepeau, 2015). In other
words, delayed false belief understanding is to be
expected in cultures in which mental states are not
appropriate objects for conjecture. This approach
has led to a widespread distinction between “East”
and “West,” or more speciﬁcally, cultures that, his-
torically, have inherited the philosophical traditions
of Ancient China or Ancient Greece (Nisbett &
Masuda, 2003). However, meta-analytic ﬁndings
underscore the importance of looking beyond this
simple East–West contrast. Speciﬁcally, drawing on
data from single culture studies, Liu et al. (2008)
have found that, relative to their North American
peers, delayed false belief understanding is
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characteristic of Chinese children living in Hong
Kong but not in mainland China.
The delayed acquisition of a theory of mind
among young children living in Hong Kong (relative
to both children in mainland China and children
from Canada and North America) is puzzling. In
particular, unlike English, both Mandarin and Can-
tonese are lexically explicit in referring to false (as
opposed to true) beliefs. Moreover, compared with
children living in mainland China, children living in
Hong Kong are more likely to have siblings and to
be bilingual: two factors that are believed to facili-
tate theory-of-mind development (Adesope, Lavin,
Thompson, & Ungerleider, 2010). One possible
explanation for the apparent delay in theory-of-
mind development among Hong Kong children
hinges on contrasts in parenting styles. For example,
in a survey-based study of over 2,000 adults living
in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Berndt, Cheung,
Lau, Hau, and Lew (1993) found that adults in Hong
Kong perceived their parents as having showed less
warmth and more control than parents in China or
Taiwan. Lai, Zhang, and Wang (2000) reported simi-
lar ﬁndings based on a parental self-report Q-sort
task comparing mothers from Hong Kong and Bei-
jing. To date, however, no study has directly com-
pared Hong Kong preschool children’s false-belief
understanding with that of children living in the
West. A ﬁrst preliminary aim of this study was
therefore to address this gap in the literature using a
comparison group that was recruited from the Uni-
ted Kingdom. Here, it is worth noting that the simi-
larities in educational systems between these two
countries (reﬂecting a century of British control in
Hong Kong) enabled us to focus on familial factors
that might account for the predicted mean group
difference in false-belief task performance.
Interestingly, with a few exceptions (e.g., Lecce &
Hughes, 2010; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee,
2006), cross-cultural comparisons have typically
overlooked family factors that might inﬂuence chil-
dren’s false belief understanding. Factors such as
socioeconomic status (SES) and family size each
show positive associations (of similar strength,
r  .20) with variation in false belief performance
(Devine & Hughes, 2017). The latter of these associa-
tions is, at ﬁrst glance, counterintuitive because fam-
ily size is typically inversely related to both
language and general cognitive ability, leading theo-
rists to posit models of “resource dilution” (e.g.,
Downey, 2001). However, as detailed observational
studies make clear, the presence of siblings provides
young children with multiple opportunities for
learning about others’ minds through pretend play,
conﬂict, and observing family interactions (e.g.,
Hughes & Devine, 2015). In the present study, which
focused on how parents may facilitate children’s
emerging understanding of mind, measures of SES
and family size were included as control variables.
A key question for the present study was
whether, in each site, within-country variation in
children’s false belief performance would be associ-
ated with variation in parental “mind-mindedness,”
that is, parents’ proclivity to view their children as
mental agents. Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, and
Clark-Carter (1998) introduced the concept of par-
ental mind-mindedness to the ﬁeld in an effort to
examine how parents shape the development of
children’s theory of mind. Online or “interactional”
measures of mind-mindedness are derived from
recording the number of “appropriate” versus
“nonattuned” mind-related comments that parents
make about their children during play interactions
(Meins et al., 2012). Ofﬂine or “representational”
measures of mind-mindedness are derived from
parents’ descriptions of their children that are then
coded for the relative frequency of reference to
either mental or nonmental (i.e., behavioral, physi-
cal, general) attributes (Meins et al., 1998). Ofﬂine
measures are more suitable for studying preschool
children than online measures. Online measures of
appropriate mind-related comments in infancy are
moderately correlated with later use of mental
descriptions in the ofﬂine task (Meins et al., 2003),
and both indices of parental mind-mindedness
show moderate associations with individual differ-
ences in children’s false belief understanding (e.g.,
Laranjo, Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2014; Lundy,
2013; Meins et al., 1998).
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst cross-cultural
study to examine parental mind-mindedness. There
are at least two reasons why one might expect
between-culture contrasts in parental mind-minded-
ness. First, evidence from several separate studies
(e.g., Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2001;
Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & DeRosnay,
2013; Meins et al., 2002) indicates that the concept
of parental mind-mindedness is related to (but dis-
tinct from) that of parental sensitivity, which is typ-
ically deﬁned as parents’ ability to “tune in” and
respond to the needs of their children. In turn,
numerous studies (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1992; Born-
stein, Putnick, Cote, Haynes, & Suwalsky, 2015;
Posada et al., 2016) have shown that sensitive par-
ental behavior and parent–infant contingent talk are
culturally universal but vary in overall amount and
quality across different cultural settings. A second
reason for expecting cross-cultural contrasts in
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parental mind-mindedness is that, as noted earlier,
cultures differ in the degree to which mental states
are viewed as objects worthy of conjecture (Lillard,
1998). Indeed parents’ propensity to use mental-
state language with their children differs according
to their cultural background (e.g., Wang, Doan, &
Song, 2010).
In addition to investigating between-country con-
trasts in mean levels of parental mind-mindedness,
this study provided an opportunity to examine, for
the ﬁrst time, whether the association between par-
ental mind-mindedness and children’s false belief
understanding is culturally invariant. In their dis-
cussion of parenting across different Chinese cul-
tures, Wang and Chang (2012) raise a point that
deserves note in relation to the current study.
Speciﬁcally, mean-level differences across cultures
in particular parenting behaviors might reﬂect the
salience of those behaviors in a particular cultural
setting and so do not necessarily signal differences
in the developmental relations between particular
parental behaviors and speciﬁc child outcomes.
That is, cultural contrasts in mean levels of a speci-
ﬁc parental attribute (such as mind-mindedness)
can co-occur with culturally invariant patterns of
association with speciﬁc child outcomes (such as
false belief performance). In the absence of direct
evidence for cultural contrasts in the correlates of
parental mind-mindedness, we applied the princi-
ple of parsimony to predict that its association with
children’s false belief performance would be cultur-
ally universal.
Turning to alternative methodological accounts
of cross-cultural contrasts, several points deserve
note. First, evidence shows that individual differ-
ences in theory of mind are closely linked with
child characteristics, such as age (Wellman, Cross,
& Watson, 2001), language ability (Milligan, Asting-
ton, & Dack, 2007), and family size (e.g., Peterson,
2000). Given these associations, it is surprising that,
with few exceptions (e.g., Hughes et al., 2014; Sab-
bagh et al., 2006), previous studies have not
attempted to control statistically for important child
characteristics, making group differences difﬁcult to
interpret. Second, the validity of applying false-
belief tasks (developed originally in Europe) in
non-European settings has been challenged (e.g.,
Lillard, 1998). Indeed, in Chinese cultures the choice
of verb in the test question impacts upon children’s
performance. Speciﬁcally, Liu et al. (2008) found
that using a “marked” belief verb (i.e., “think fal-
sely”) makes the false-belief task easier than when
using a “neutral” belief verb. To ensure that any
between-group difference did not reﬂect this
contrast in lexical ambiguity, we took several steps
to remove these confounds (e.g., by choosing neu-
tral verbs such as “look/zaau2” and “think/gok3
dak1”).
Third, it is now recognized that group differ-
ences can arise in cross-cultural research for reasons
unrelated to the underlying ability in question
(Brown, 2006; Chen, 2008). Rather than reﬂecting a
genuine difference in children’s understanding of
mind, group differences can appear if test items
have different cultural meanings that interfere with
responding (Byrne & Campbell, 1999). This “forks
versus chopsticks” (Chen, 2008) account highlights
the importance of testing that the data show mea-
surement invariance across groups. Cross-cultural
studies in psychology have traditionally adopted
analytic approaches (e.g., analysis of variance, t
tests, chi-square) that assume that test items func-
tion in a similar way for all participants regardless
of group membership (e.g., Byrne & Campbell,
1999). Such analytic approaches conﬂate task-speci-
ﬁc variance, error variance, and performance on the
underlying latent factor, and so might generate mis-
leading results regarding any potential cross-cul-
tural differences. The assumption of measurement
invariance (i.e., whether test items exhibit equiva-
lent relations with underlying latent constructs in
different groups) for all participants in a study can
be tested using conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA)
and latent variable modeling (Brown, 2006). A
latent variable analytic approach to cross-cultural
data analysis confers several beneﬁts: (a) It is
hypothesis driven and so enables researchers to
specify measurement models in advance, (b) multi-
ple groups CFA permits researchers to examine the
stability of a measurement model across different
groups, and (c) latent variable analyses use error-
free “true” scores that provide better estimates of
group differences or associations between variables
(Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011). In the only cross-cul-
tural theory-of-mind study to adopt this approach,
Hughes et al. (2014) compared performance on a
battery of false-belief tasks in 5- and 6-year-old chil-
dren in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, and
found only partial measurement invariance high-
lighting the need for measurement invariance to be
tested rather than assumed. For example, Italian
children appeared unfairly disadvantaged by one
test item that concerned a parent lying to her child
underscoring the potential of test bias to distort
ﬁndings.
In sum, the current study involved parent–child
dyads from Hong Kong and the United Kingdom
and examined cultural contrasts in parental mind-
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mindedness and in children’s false belief perfor-
mance, associations between these two measures,
and whether the expected group difference in chil-
dren’s false-belief task performance could be
explained by a parallel contrast in parental mind-
mindedness. In addition, we sought to address the
methodological problems encountered in previous
studies by ensuring there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between our samples in age, gender, and abil-
ity; preparing “culturally fair” testing materials;
and testing the measurement equivalence of the
false-belief task battery prior to performing group
comparisons.
Method
Participants
The data for this study were collected between
March and December 2014. The U.K. sample con-
sisted of 120 (61 males) parent–child dyads
recruited from local nurseries, playgroups, parent
mailing lists, libraries, and shopping centers in
Cambridge, United Kingdom. We recruited 127
parent–child dyads. Seven children were excluded
from the ﬁnal sample due to noncompliance/non-
completion of tasks (N = 5) or failure of control
questions on the false belief task (N = 2). The
Hong Kong sample consisted of 121 (61 males)
parent–child dyads recruited from local kinder-
gartens in New Territories. Initially 131 parent–
child dyads were recruited. Nine children were
excluded from the ﬁnal sample due to failure of
control questions on the false belief task, and
another one was excluded due to a later parental
report of developmental delay. To minimize the
potential effects of confounding variables, we set
out to ensure that there were no differences
between the two samples in gender composition
and age.
The two samples were matched in gender com-
position, v2(1) = .004, p = .95, and age, MUK = 3.92,
SD = 0.53, range = 3.00–4.95 years; MHK = 3.99,
SD = 0.50, range = 3.09–4.99 years, t(239) = 1.08,
p = .28. In addition, there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the two groups in the total number
of siblings, MUK = 0.92, SD = 0.89; MHK = 0.79,
SD = 0.75, t(239) = 1.15, p = .25, or number of
child-aged siblings, MUK = 0.68, SD = 0.61;
MHK = 0.61, SD = 0.64, t(239) = 0.89, p = .37, per-
formance on tests of nonverbal ability, MUK = 16.85,
SD = 8.21; MHK = 18.21, SD = 7.62, t(239) = 1.33,
p = .18, and expressive language ability,
MUK = 15.12, SD = 7.43; MHK = 14.43, SD = 6.88, t
(239) = .75, p = .46. There were signiﬁcant differ-
ences in levels of parental education. Parents in the
United Kingdom (N = 98) were more likely to have
a degree level education than parents in Hong
Kong (N = 42), v2(1) = 53.76, p < .001. This reﬂects
local trends in higher level education. Approxi-
mately 20% of adults in Hong Kong and almost
55% of adults in Cambridge have a degree level
education (Hong Kong Education Bureau, n.d.;
Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2012). Children in
Hong Kong spent signiﬁcantly more hours per
week at nursery, MHK = 26.63 hr, SD = 11.97, than
children in the United Kingdom, MUK = 18.85 hr,
SD = 11.02, t(239) = 5.25, p < .001. Given these dif-
ferences in parental education and nursery atten-
dance, we included these measures as covariates in
our models.
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the local uni-
versity research ethics committees. Parents and
children took part in a session lasting up to
90 min in an observation laboratory at each uni-
versity. Children completed a battery of tasks
designed to measure false belief understanding,
verbal ability, and nonverbal ability. Individual
child cognitive testing lasted approximately
30 min. The children in both sites completed
additional structured parent–child play observa-
tions (not reported here). In an adjoining room,
parents completed a short demographic question-
naire and an interview. The children completed
the task battery in a ﬁxed counterbalanced format
with each false-belief task being alternated with
language and nonverbal ability measures. Chil-
dren were provided with rest breaks and
rewarded with stickers for completion of tasks.
Parents were debriefed at the end of each session
and provided with £15 or HK$50, and children
received a small gift for taking part. Testing ses-
sions followed a detailed manual to ensure that
the procedures in each site were identical. The
same stimuli and materials were used in both
sites of the study. In the United Kingdom, all
testing sessions were completed in English and in
Hong Kong, all testing sessions were completed
in Cantonese. All materials were prepared in Eng-
lish ﬁrst and then translated into Cantonese by a
panel of three English/Cantonese bilingual psy-
chologists that included the third author, adopting
a collaborative and iterative translation approach
to ensure conceptual equivalence (Douglas &
Craig, 2007).
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Measures
Children’s False Belief Understanding
The children completed four tasks designed to
measure individual differences in false belief under-
standing.
Change of location false-belief task (Baron-Cohen, Les-
lie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand,
2011). The children completed two separate
change of location tasks. Both tasks were adminis-
tered using specially prepared picture stimuli devel-
oped by the authors that involved two sets of
characters (i.e., Su and Shaun, Andy and Sally). In
both stories, the children were introduced to a story
character who places an object in one location (e.g.,
a cupboard or a drawer) before going out to play. In
the character’s absence, another character enters the
scene and places the object in a different location.
Following these events, the children were then asked
three forced-choice questions to assess their memory
for the events in the story (e.g., “Where is the book
now?,” “Who put it there?,” “Where did Sally put
the book in the beginning?”). If children failed any
of these three initial questions, the experimenter
reread the ﬁrst part of the story. If the participant
continued to fail any one of these items, testing was
discontinued (N = 2 in United Kingdom, N = 9 in
Hong Kong). Following these three questions, the
story continued with the character returning to the
scene. The experimenter then asked the false belief
prediction question (e.g., “Where will Sally look for
her book?”). In both the English and the Cantonese
versions, we chose to use the neutral verb “look” in
these questions (“zaau2” in Cantonese). Children
scored 1 point for a correct response and 0 points for
an incorrect response. Following this question, the
experimenter showed a ﬁnal image of the character
searching for the object in the location he or she left
it in. The children were then asked the false belief
explanation question (e.g., “Why did Sally look for
her book in the cupboard?”).
Children’s explanations were coded using the
scheme reported by Perner et al. (2011) with “cor-
rect” answers including both implicit (“it was in
there earlier”) and explicit (“she thought it was in
there”) explanations (1 point) and “incorrect”
answers referring to information about the charac-
ter’s desires or irrelevant facts (0 points). Consistent
with previous studies (e.g., Hughes et al., 2014), the
scores from the prediction and explanation question
were summed together so that children received a
total possible score of 2 points for each task.
Unexpected contents false-belief task (Gopnik & Ast-
ington, 1988). For this task, the children were
shown a box of plasters from Hong Kong, which
had both English and Cantonese labeling and
depicted a clear image of a plaster. This box con-
tained some crayons. First, the children were asked
what was in the box. Underscoring the fairness of
these test materials, no child in either country failed
this question. Following this, the children were then
asked to look inside the box and tell the experi-
menter what was inside. After this the children
were asked to return the crayons to the box and
seal it up. The children were then asked three
forced-choice questions. First, children were asked
the representational change question (i.e., “Before
you looked inside, what did you think was inside
the box?”). This was followed by a reality control
question (i.e., “What’s in the box really?”). Finally
children were asked the false belief question (i.e.,
“Your mummy hasn’t seen what’s inside this box.
If she sees this box all closed up, what will she
think is inside it?”). In both the English and the
Cantonese version, we chose to use the neutral verb
“think” in these questions (“gok3 dak1” in Can-
tonese). To be credited with passing either question,
children had to pass the reality control question.
Responses were summed to give a total possible
score of 2 points.
Unexpected identity false-belief task (Hughes, 1998;
Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). In this task,
the experimenter introduced a wordless pop-up
picture book (Moerbeek, 1994). On each page the
experimenter pointed to a picture that appeared to
be an eye peeping through the page and asked the
child “What’s that?” Upon turning the page, the
picture was revealed to be an animal’s eye.
After ﬁve consecutive trials, the experimenter
reached the penultimate page and pointed to the
picture that appeared to be an eye and asked
“What’s that?” Upon turning the page, the experi-
menter revealed that the picture was in fact a spot
on a snake’s back. The experimenter then turned
back to the penultimate page and asked three
forced-choice questions. First, children were asked a
representational change question (i.e., “What did
you think it was before we turned the page?”).
Next children were asked a reality control question
(i.e., “What is it really?”). Finally, children were
asked a false belief question (i.e., “Your mummy
hasn’t seen this book before. If she sees this
page what will she think it is?”). Again, neutral
verbs, either “think” or “gok3 dak1,” were used in
these questions. To pass either question, children
had to pass the reality control question. Responses
were summed together to give a total possible score
of 2.
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Children’s Language Ability
Although measures of receptive vocabulary (e.g.,
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) are widely used
in research on children’s theory of mind, the absence
of information about the relative difﬁculty of partic-
ular words in different languages means that these
measures are not appropriate for use across different
cultures. Moreover, meta-analytic data show that
there are no differences in the strength of correlation
between different measures of language ability (i.e.,
measures of semantics vs. syntax) and individual
differences in false belief understanding (Milligan
et al., 2007). To provide a culturally fair measure of
language ability the children in both sites completed
the Bus Story Test (Renfrew, 1997; Stokes & Wong,
1996). This task was available in both English and
Cantonese. The Bus Story information score pro-
vided us with a culturally fair measure of children’s
language ability. Rather than scoring children’s use
of speciﬁc vocabulary, linguistic complexity, syntax,
or sentence length, the information score in both the
English and Cantonese version represents the num-
ber of story elements in the children’s narratives.
The information score captures both expressive and
receptive language abilities in that children must
comprehend the narrative and then retell it (Kovas
et al., 2005). The information score is strongly corre-
lated with measures of receptive vocabulary, and
like measures of receptive vocabulary, it exhibits
moderate correlations with children’s false belief
task performance (e.g., Adams & Gathercole, 1996;
Cutting & Dunn, 1999). In both sites, the experi-
menter read aloud a short narrative accompanied by
a set of pictures, and the children were asked to
retell the story using the picture stimuli as prompts.
The children’s narratives were digitally recorded
and transcribed verbatim. These stories were scored
for total information (i.e., 1 point for each story
element in their narrative).
Children’s Nonverbal Ability
To provide an index of nonverbal ability, the
children in both sites completed the object assembly
task from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale
of Intelligence (Wechsler, 2003). In this task, partici-
pants were required to assemble a set of two-
dimensional puzzles depicting cartoon images of
objects (e.g., bird, clock, car, ﬁsh). To date, very few
studies of children’s theory of mind (e.g., Low,
2010; Hughes, 1998) and, to our knowledge, no
cross-cultural studies of children’s theory of mind
have incorporated measures of nonverbal ability.
We chose the object assembly task over the matrix
reasoning task because it was suitable for use with
3- and 4-year-old children. In contrast, the matrix
reasoning task can only be used with children aged
over 4 years (Wechsler, 2003). The object assembly
task is strongly correlated with performance IQ in
3- and 4-year-old children (.82 < r < .85) and shows
acceptable 1-month test–retest reliability
(.74 < r < .76) in this age group (Wechsler, 2003).
The task began with two training trials in which
the experimenter demonstrated how to use the puz-
zle pieces. For example, in one training trial, the
experimenter showed the child how two pieces ﬁt
together to make a picture of a ball and then asked
the child to make the same picture. In each subse-
quent trial, the experimenter presented the child
with the pieces for the puzzle and stated, “These
pieces make a(n) ‘X’. Put them together as fast as
you can and tell me when you’re ﬁnished.” The
number of correct junctures in the ﬁrst 90 s was
then recorded. Children completed up to a maxi-
mum of 14 trials (including the training trials). The
scores for each trial were summed together giving a
total possible range of 0 to 37 points.
Parental Mind-Mindedness
Consistent with previous studies of preschool-
aged children, we used a brief interview to obtain a
representational measure of parental mind-minded-
ness (Meins & Fernyhough, 2015). The interview
question was based on the 5-min speech sample
(Daley, Sonuga-Barke, & Thompson, 2003). Prior to
the interview, we informed parents that there were
no right or wrong answers. We then read aloud the
following instructions:
“I’d like to hear your thoughts and feelings
about (child’s name), in your own words and
without my interrupting with any questions or
comments. When I ask you to begin, I’d like you
to speak for 5 minutes, telling me what kind of a
person (child’s name) is and how the two of you
get along together.”
Parents’ responses were recorded using a digital
recording device and later transcribed verbatim.
We coded the transcripts using the scheme
developed by Meins and Fernyhough (2015). Indi-
vidual descriptions of the child were coded into
one of four exhaustive categories: mental (i.e., com-
ments referring to the child’s mental life), behav-
ioral (i.e., comments referring to the child’s
behavior or routines), physical (i.e., comments
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referring to the child’s appearance), or general (i.e.,
vague or unclear comments about the child not ﬁt-
ting the other three categories). Given that English
was a common language between the two research
teams, we established interrater reliability by dou-
ble coding a random selection of 25% (N = 30) of
the U.K. transcripts and 12.5% (N = 15) of the tran-
scripts from the Hong Kong sample (translated into
English). These transcripts were anonymized so that
the two raters were unaware of the children’s false
belief test scores. The interrater reliability for coding
each comment was good, j = .79, p < .001. Intra-
class correlations (ICC) for the total number of com-
ments in each category were all signiﬁcant, all
ps < .001, indicating good interrater reliability for
the total number of mental (ICC = .92), behavioral
(ICC = .91), physical (ICC = .83), and general
(ICC = .83) descriptions identiﬁed by each rater.
Results
Analytic Approach
We used a latent variable approach in Mplus
Version 7 (Muthen & Muthen, 2012) to analyse our
data. Given that our data included measures with non
normal distributions, we used a mean- and variance-
adjusted weighted least squares estimator (rather than
a maximum likelihood estimator) in each of our mod-
els (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011). For each model, we
evaluated the adequacy of ﬁt using Brown’s (2006)
four recommended criteria: a nonsigniﬁcant chi-
square test, comparative ﬁt index (CFI) ≥ 0.90,
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) ≥ 0.90, and root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.08. Effect
sizes for the various model parameters were inter-
preted in accordance with recommendations from
Kline (2011): small standardized effect sizes ranged
from .10 to .30, moderate effect sizes ranged from .30
to .50, and large effects were > .50.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for each
of the key study measures in the sample as a whole
and separately by each country. Before data analy-
sis, we inspected each of the key variables for
extreme outliers (cases  3 SD from the mean) in
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong samples.
There were three mental description outliers and
one behavioral description outlier in the Hong
Kong data set. We report the analyses including
these cases. Table 2 shows the correlations between
each of the main study measures.
Children’s False Belief Understanding in the United
Kingdom and Hong Kong
Our ﬁrst aim was to compare children from the
United Kingdom with children from Hong Kong in
terms of false belief understanding. Consistent with
previous studies (e.g., Hughes et al., 2014), the four
false belief task indicators showed moderate tetra-
choric correlations (see Table 2). Building on previ-
ously published studies (e.g., Hughes et al., 2014),
we used CFA to examine the ﬁt of a single latent
factor for measuring individual differences in false
belief understanding. That is, we hypothesized that
each of the four categorical false belief task indica-
tors would load onto a single latent factor. We
scaled the metric of the latent factor by constraining
the loading of the marker indicator (i.e., Change of
Location 1) to 1. Given the similarity between the
stories and questions used in the two change of
location tasks, we speciﬁed a correlation between
these two items. In doing so, we hoped to distin-
guish between task-speciﬁc variance and variance
due to false belief understanding (e.g., Brown,
2006). This single latent factor solution provided an
excellent ﬁt to the data, v2(1) = 0.35, p = .56,
CFI = 1, TLI = 1, RMSEA = 0.01. Each of the false
belief task items loaded signiﬁcantly onto the false
belief understanding latent factor with standardized
loadings ranging from .47 to .78, all ps < .001. Next,
we evaluated the reliability of this latent factor by
specifying a graded item response theory model
using robust maximum likelihood estimation to
estimate the precision of the false belief understand-
ing task battery at different levels of the underlying
latent factor (Embretson & Reise, 2000; Muthen &
Muthen, 2012). Findings revealed that the false
belief battery was most reliable when testing partic-
ipants performing between 1 SD above and below
the mean. For participants with average levels of
false belief understanding, the reliability coefﬁcient
was .84. For those with lower than average ability
(1 SD) and higher than average ability (+1 SD),
the reliability coefﬁcients were .67 and .82, respec-
tively.
To test the validity of the false belief understand-
ing latent factor, we speciﬁed a second model in
which we regressed each of the four false belief task
indicators onto language scores. Once again, the
model provided an excellent ﬁt to the data,
v2(1) = 0.16, p = .69, CFI = 1, TLI = 1, RMSEA
= 0.01. Supporting the validity of the false belief
understanding latent factor, each of the four task
indicators continued to load signiﬁcantly onto the
single latent factor (standardized loadings ranged
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from .31 to .69, all ps < .001). That is, language ability
and shared method effects did not explain the rela-
tions between these task indicators.
Next, we tested the assumption of measurement
invariance of the above single latent factor solution
across the U.K. and Hong Kong samples using mul-
tiple groups CFA (Brown, 2006). To this end, we
constrained the factor structure, item loadings,
thresholds, correlated residuals, and latent factor
variances to be equal across both countries. This
model provided a good ﬁt to the data,
v2(1) = 16.27, p = .09, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.99,
RMSEA = 0.07, indicating that there was no evi-
dence of bias favoring one group over the other.
That is, the test items exhibited equivalent relations
with the false belief latent factor in both countries.
Next, we constrained the latent factor means to be
equal across both groups in order to assess group
differences in performance between children from
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. This con-
straint produced a signiﬁcant decrease in model ﬁt,
Dv2(1) = 8.74, p = .003, indicating a signiﬁcant
group difference. Speciﬁcally, as hypothesized, the
children from the United Kingdom signiﬁcantly out
performed their Hong Kong counterparts on the
false belief understanding latent factor, Cohen’s
d = 0.47, p < .01, despite there being no signiﬁcant
differences between the two groups with respect to
age, gender, verbal and nonverbal ability, and
number of siblings.
Parental Mind-Mindedness in the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong
Our second aim was to examine parental mind-
mindedness in the United Kingdom and Hong
Kong. Inspection of the descriptive statistics
showed that the ratio of mental to “nonmental”
(i.e., behavioral, general, or physical) descriptions
was broadly similar in both samples. Rather than
using proportional scores, we examined the overall
total number of descriptions made by parents dur-
ing the interview. We chose to use this approach
because the creation of proportion scores might
artiﬁcially inﬂate or attenuate a parent’s ranking.
For example, if one parent were to give just one
mental description of their child and two nonmen-
tal descriptions during the 5 min of the task and
another parent were to give 20 mental descriptions
and 40 nonmental descriptions, these parents
would achieve the same “mental description”
score. We therefore not only used raw scores but
also included the total number of nonmental
descriptions as a control measure of parental ver-
bosity in our analyses (Meins & Fernyhough,
2015). Note that even when the total number of
nonmental parental descriptions was included as a
covariate in a between-participants analysis of
covariance, the British parents gave signiﬁcantly
more mental descriptions of their children than the
Hong Kong parents, F(1, 238) = 6.45, p = .012,
partial g2 = 0.03.
Does Parental Mind-Mindedness Explain Cultural
Differences in False Belief Understanding?
Our third and ﬁnal aim was to examine whether
the observed cultural differences in parental mind-
mindedness might account for the mean difference
in false belief understanding between children from
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. Prior to
examining cross-cultural differences, we ﬁrst
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Whole sample United Kingdom Hong Kong
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
Age (years) 3.96 0.51 3–4.99 3.92 0.53 3–4.95 3.99 0.50 3.09–4.99
Nonverbal IQ 17.53 7.93 2–35 16.85 8.21 2–35 18.21 7.62 2–32
Language ability 14.77 7.15 0–36 15.12 7.43 0–36 14.43 6.87 2–32
Child-aged siblings 0.65 0.62 0–3 0.68 0.61 0–3 0.61 0.64 0–3
False belief: Change of Location 1 0.82 0.78 0–2 0.88 0.79 0–2 0.75 0.78 0–2
False belief: Change of Location 2 0.95 0.83 0–2 0.97 0.81 0–2 0.93 0.85 0–2
False belief: Unexpected contents 0.83 0.81 0–2 1.03 0.86 0–2 0.62 0.71 0–2
False belief: Unexpected identity 0.97 0.81 0–2 1.02 0.82 0–2 0.93 0.82 0–2
Parental mind-mindedness 11.09 6.02 0–29 13.18 5.74 1–29 9.03 5.60 0–24
Parental nonmental attributes 29.75 12.76 3–95 33.93 11.04 10–74 25.64 13.04 3–95
Hours/week in nursery 22.75 12.13 0–51 18.85 11.02 0–45 26.63 11.97 12–51
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examined the relations between parental mind-
mindedness and false belief understanding sepa-
rately in each country. To this end, we examined
the unique effect of parental mind-mindedness on
false belief latent factor scores by regressing chil-
dren’s performance on the latent factor onto age,
gender, language ability, SES, family size, number
of hours spent at nursery, and parental mind-mind-
edness. We also entered the number of nonmental
attributes provided by parents to control for overall
parental verbosity. The results of these models are
presented in Figures 1A and 1B. The model pro-
vided an excellent ﬁt to the United Kingdom data,
v2(27) = 23.65, p = .65, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00,
RMSEA = 0. The model accounted for 66% of the
variance in scores on the false belief latent factor.
The model also provided an excellent ﬁt to the
Hong Kong data, v2(27) = 31.11, p = .27, CFI = 0.97,
TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.04. This model accounted
for 44% of the variance in scores on the false belief
latent factor. Notably, parental mind-mindedness
was a signiﬁcant (but weak) predictor of false belief
understanding in both the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong (see Figures 1A and 1B).
Using the analytic approach proposed by
Preacher and Hayes (2004), we speciﬁed a model to
examine whether parental mind-mindedness medi-
ated the effect of country (Hong Kong = 0, United
Kingdom = 1) on children’s false-belief task perfor-
mance. To control for potential confounds, we
regressed the false-belief latent factor onto chil-
dren’s age, language ability, number of child-aged
siblings, total number of hours per week spent at
nursery, and parental SES. To account for differ-
ences in parental verbosity during the speech sam-
ple task, we also entered the total number of
nonmental comments into the model as a predictor
of both false belief understanding and parental
mind-mindedness.
The model provided a good ﬁt to the data,
v2(35) = 41.02, p = .22, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.98,
RMSEA = 0.03. Figure 2 shows the unstandardized
and standardized parameter estimates for this
model, which accounted for 40% of the variance in
scores on the false belief latent factor. Country
exerted direct effects on both parental use of non-
mental attributes and parental mind-mindedness.
As hypothesized, parental mind-mindedness fully
mediated the effect of country on children’s false
belief understanding, B = 0.07, SE = 0.035, Z = 1.97,
p = .05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.12]. In contrast, nonmental
descriptions did not mediate the relation between
country and children’s false belief understanding,
B = 0.03, SE = 0.038, Z = 0.65, p = .51, 95% CITa
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[0.09, 0.04]. In addition, there was a signiﬁcant
indirect effect of country on false belief understand-
ing via nonmental attributes and parental mind-
mindedness, B = 0.04, SE = 0.019, Z = 2.22, p = .03,
95% CI [0.01, 0.08]. That is, country predicted par-
ents’ overall use of nonmental attributes, which in
turn predicted parental mind-mindedness and chil-
dren’s false belief understanding. Together, these
results show that parental mind-mindedness
explained the observed differences between the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong in children’s the-
ory of mind.
Discussion
This cross-cultural study of 241 parent–child dyads
living in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom was
motivated by meta-analytic evidence for a puzzling
delay in false belief understanding among
preschoolers in Hong Kong relative to children in
both mainland China and North America (Liu
et al., 2008). It is the ﬁrst study to include a direct
comparison of theory-of-mind task performance in
Hong Kong preschoolers and their Western coun-
terparts. Using tests of measurement invariance,
our ﬁndings conﬁrmed the predicted delay among
A
B
Figure 1. Predictors of individual differences in false belief understanding in the United Kingdom (A) and Hong Kong (B) samples.
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. Paths depict unstandardized estimates. Standardized estimates are shown in parentheses.
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preschoolers in Hong Kong. This is also the ﬁrst
published study to examine parental mind-minded-
ness in an Asian sample. Indeed, as noted else-
where (e.g., Lewis, Huang, & Rooksby, 2006),
measures of children’s social environments have
rarely been included in cross-cultural studies in this
ﬁeld. Our ﬁndings highlight the universality of par-
ental mind-mindedness as a predictor of children’s
theory-of-mind performance, as there were signiﬁ-
cant associations between these two constructs in
both cultures. This universal association is striking
because, on average, parents in Hong Kong were
much less likely than their British counterparts to
describe their children using mental attributes.
Importantly, our mediation model showed that the
group difference in parental mind-mindedness
explained the group difference in children’s theory-
of-mind task performance. This is a critical step for
cross-cultural research in this ﬁeld which has been
largely restricted to reports of similarities or con-
trasts in child performance with almost no direct
testing of the social factors that may underpin any
group differences.
Children’s False Belief Understanding in the United
Kingdom and Hong Kong
Our ﬁrst set of ﬁndings add to a growing body
of literature demonstrating marked differences
between cultures in children’s ability to reason
about beliefs. It is interesting to note that although
signiﬁcant, the effect size (Cohen’s d) for the differ-
ence between our two matched groups of partici-
pants was substantially smaller than those reported
by Liu et al. (2008). Effect sizes for the differences
between Hong Kong and North American chil-
dren’s false belief task performance were 0.92 (for
Hong Kong vs. U.S.) and 1.42 (for Hong Kong vs.
Canada; Liu et al., 2008). One obvious reason for
this difference is that the previously reported meta-
analytic ﬁndings relied on an indirect comparison
between Hong Kong children and children in North
America. That is, the studies in the meta-analysis
were single culture studies. Several methodological
shortcomings may also constrain the conclusions
that can be drawn from existing cross-cultural ﬁnd-
ings. These include a heavy reliance on simple
pass/fail measures (which are not sensitive to indi-
vidual differences) and a widespread failure to con-
trol for key background variables such as verbal
ability or to test for measurement invariance
(Hughes et al., 2014). Despite addressing these
potential methodological confounds and testing the
measurement invariance of our battery of false-
belief tasks, our study still revealed a substantial
difference in children’s theory-of-mind task perfor-
mance. Thus, the observed differences in theory of
mind between children in the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong are unlikely to be due solely to
methodological factors.
Figure 2. Mind-mindedness mediates the link between country and false belief understanding.
Note. **p < .01. Paths depict unstandardized estimates. Standardized estimates are shown in parentheses.
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Parental Mind-Mindedness in the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong
Our study ﬁndings showed that, compared with
parents in the United Kingdom, parents in Hong
Kong offered fewer descriptions of their children’s
attributes in general (and mental attributes in par-
ticular) than did parents in the United Kingdom.
Note that the parental speech samples were gath-
ered in equivalent settings (a university laboratory
room) across sites using precisely the same instruc-
tions and protocol, such that the contrasting num-
ber of child-focused descriptions did not reﬂect a
methodological artifact of contextual cues.
How might contrasts in parental mind-minded-
ness be explained? One possibility is that the
observed cross-cultural differences in parental
mind-mindedness (and indeed children’s false belief
understanding) could be explained by sharp differ-
ences in parental education between the two sam-
ples. Indeed, meta-analytic results show that
individual differences in children’s false belief
understanding are moderately correlated with par-
ental SES (Devine & Hughes, 2017). Against this
view, however, parental mind-mindedness was
unrelated to parental education in either sample;
this lack of association is consistent with previous
ﬁndings from studies involving samples with lower
average levels of education (e.g., Meins et al., 2003).
Moreover, in contrast the parental education was
statistically controlled for in each of our models.
Thus, our current ﬁndings do not support the view
that the cross-cultural contrast in mind-mindedness
could be explained by differences in parental educa-
tion. However, matching samples for parental edu-
cation is an obvious goal for future cross-cultural
studies of theory of mind.
In a thoughtful discussion of the social contexts in
which mentalizing skills are likely to prove useful,
Ames et al. (2001) noted that situations involving
strong social norms are likely to place relatively few
demands on an individual’s ability to read others’
minds. From this perspective, it is worth noting that
the very high value attached to ﬁlial piety within
Asian cultures means that children are expected to
conform to social norms regardless of their own
views. In other words, echoing distinctions between
learned social conventions and complex interactional
social skills (Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994), parental
socialization of children in particular cultures may
not require fostering children’s social understanding.
Support for this view comes from a study that
directly compared the socialization goals of parents
living in the United Kingdom and in Hong Kong.
Speciﬁcally, Pearson and Rao (2003) found that Hong
Kong parents were, on average, much more likely
than their United Kingdom counterparts to place a
high value on ﬁlial piety. Moreover, in both coun-
tries, an emphasis on ﬁlial piety was associated with
authoritarian parenting, whereas an emphasis on
socioemotional skills was associated with authorita-
tive parenting. As noted in the Introduction, parental
mind-mindedness is positively related to sensitive
parenting and therefore might be inversely related to
authoritarian parenting, such that the results from
Pearson and Rao’s (2003) study of socialization goals
might provide a mirror image of the ﬁndings from
the present study. In other words, a parental empha-
sis on individual thoughts and interests may well
hinder rather than help achieve socialization goals if,
for example, those goals are focused on fostering ﬁl-
ial piety. Exploring the links between mind-minded-
ness and parenting style is a promising avenue for
future research.
The current study makes a clear contribution to
the literature in demonstrating cross-cultural con-
trasts in both children’s false belief understanding
and parental mind-mindedness and cultural invari-
ance in the association between these two measures.
That said, by including just two sites, it is difﬁcult
to avoid conclusions that simply perpetuate old
stereotypes regarding contrasts between East and
West (Wang & Chang, 2012). The substantial differ-
ences in parenting styles between families living in
China and in Hong Kong that have been reported
in several large-scale studies (e.g., Berndt et al.,
1993) demonstrate the multiplicity of cultures
encompassed by the terms “East.” Future cross-cul-
tural studies in this ﬁeld should therefore include at
least three samples to achieve a more ﬁne-grained
picture of the processes underpinning social inﬂu-
ences on children’s acquisition of a theory of mind.
For example, a recent study of school-aged children
living in the United Kingdom or Hong Kong has
shown that the pattern of between-country differ-
ences in theory of mind and executive function is
dependent on whether the Hong Kong sample is
recruited from local or international schools (Wang,
Devine, Wong, & Hughes, 2016). Speciﬁcally, com-
pared with their United Kingdom counterparts,
both Hong Kong samples showed superior execu-
tive function, and only the Hong Kong children
attending local schools lagged behind their United
Kingdom peers on tests of theory of mind. Beyond
highlighting the importance of comparing more
than two samples, this differentiated pattern of
results underscores the need to adopt a similar mul-
tifaceted approach in future work.
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Parental Mind-Mindedness and False Belief
Understanding
Our third set of ﬁndings related to the links
between parental mind-mindedness and children’s
false belief understanding. Interestingly the links
between these two constructs were signiﬁcant and
similar in magnitude across countries despite the
group differences in mean levels of both parental
mind-mindedness and children’s theory-of-mind
task performance. The universality of associations
between mind-mindedness and children’s theory of
mind strengthens accounts of familial inﬂuences on
theory of mind that focus on the expert tuition pro-
vided by mind-minded parents (e.g., Heyes & Frith,
2014). Moreover, our ﬁndings demonstrated that
when group differences in parental mind-minded-
ness were taken into account, the cross-cultural
contrast in children’s theory-of-mind task perfor-
mance attenuated. This point underscores the inde-
pendence of group differences and within-group
associations. That is, even in a culture in which
mind-mindedness is not a particularly prominent
feature of caregiving, within-group variation can
still have meaningful correlations. Of course, the
cross-sectional nature of our data set constrains any
conclusions about the developmental role of paren-
tal mind-mindedness in children’s false belief
understanding. That said our ﬁndings provide an
exciting starting point for cross-cultural investiga-
tions of familial inﬂuences on children’s theory of
mind.
Future studies might examine potential contrasts
in the nature and relative salience of predictors of
individual differences in theory of mind for chil-
dren from different cultures. Although the variables
included in the current study explained an impres-
sive 64% of the variation in performance on tests of
theory of mind among preschoolers in the United
Kingdom, the same measures explained just 44% of
the corresponding variation among Hong Kong
preschoolers. In addition, hours spent in nursery
were inversely related to theory of mind in British
preschoolers but were unrelated to theory of mind
in Hong Kong preschoolers. Together, these ﬁnd-
ings indicate the need to widen the net in order to
identify other variables that might contribute to
individual differences in theory of mind in non-
Western children. In a recent meta-analysis on fam-
ily correlates of theory of mind, Devine and
Hughes (2017) identiﬁed four factors that have been
widely studied: SES, family size, parental mind-
mindedness, and mental-state talk. Interestingly,
very few of the included studies in this review
included hours in nonparental care as a predictor
variable. Moreover, the interplay and overlap
between these family correlates of false belief task
performance also remain largely unexplored. Our
study highlights the need for further investigation
in this area.
Conclusions
The current study provides the ﬁrst examination
of the links between parental mind-mindedness and
children’s theory of mind in two cultures. Our
results indicate cross-cultural differences in both
preschool children’s understanding of false beliefs
and in parental mind-mindedness. Consistent with
sociocultural accounts of children’s theory-of-mind
development, we propose that the observed cross-
cultural differences in children’s mental-state rea-
soning are unlikely to be due solely to methodolog-
ical artifacts. Instead, we argue that the results
support the conclusion that cross-cultural dispari-
ties in children’s ability to reason about false beliefs
probably reﬂect contrasts in aspects of family life
related to parental mind-mindedness.
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